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Report of the Committee on Immigration
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of the Bar of the City of New York: An
Analysis of Discrimination Resulting







The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),' signed into
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1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered seluons of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IRCA].
immigration law and policy since the McCarran-Walter Act of
1952.2 IRCA's enactment was preceded by years of controversy.
While its legalization provisions and their implementation have been
the focus of much comment and criticism, particularly in light of the
lower than predicted number of individuals who benefited, it is
IRCA's broad employer sanctions provisions that are now the center
of debate.
Employer sanctions were designed to be the primary legal deter-
rent to unlawful immigration into the United States. The statute
mandates an inquiry into the immigration status of all individuals
who are hired, recruited, or referred for a fee, through completion of
an Employment Eligibility Verification Form (the 1-9 form). Em-
ployers who fail to comply with this requirement or who knowingly
hire aliens not authorized to work are subject to sanctions.
Because of the concern that sanctions might result in discrimina-
tion, Congress incorporated into IRCA a mandate that the General
Accounting Office (GAO) prepare three annual reports describing
the results of the implementation and enforcement of the employer
sanctions provisions.3 Each of these reports must address whether:
(1) such provisions have been carried out satisfactorily; (2) a pattern
of discrimination on the basis of national origin has resulted against
eligible workers seeking employment; and (3) an unnecessary regula-
tory burden has been created for employers hiring such workers.4 In
its third report, the GAO must also certify whether or not a "wide-
spread pattern of discrimination has resulted against citizens or na-
tionals of the United States or against eligible workers seeking em-
ployment solely from the implementation of" employer sanctions.5 If
the GAO finds such discrimination, IRCA provides a mechanism for
expedited congressional review of the employer sanctions provisions."
On January 30, 1989, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York hosted a symposium to discuss the legal interpretations
and methodologies relevant to the GAO's mandate. The Symposium
was attended by more than 120 individuals from across the country,
including experts in civil rights and immigration law, representatives
of state and local human rights organizations, and social scientists.
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)).
3. IRCA § 274A(j)(1). The IRCA provisions concerning the GAO mandate are
codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(j)-(n).
4. IRCA § 274A(j)(1).
5. Id. at § 274A(k)(1).
6. Id. at §§ 274A(O-(n).
7. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Methodology, Legal Defi-
nitions and Interpretations in Documenting the Employer Sanctions and Anti-Discrimi-
nation Provisions of IRCA (Jan. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Symposium] (available from the
Association, 132 West 43rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10036).
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Participants included representatives of the GAO, the staffs of the
Senate and House subcommittees on immigration, the Special Coun-
sel for Unfair Immigration Related Employment Practices of the
United States Department of Justice, the New York State Inter-
Agency Task Force on Immigration Affairs, the New York City
Commission on Human Rights, the Chicago Commission on Human
Relations, Hunter College, the University of California at Irvine,
Radcliffe College, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Mexican
American Legal Defense Fund, the Coalition for Humane Immigra-
tion Rights of Los Angeles, the National Center for Immigrants
Rights, and the Center for Immigrants Rights. This Report of the
Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York draws from the Symposium, the
first and second GAO reports, the legislative history of IRCA, and
other relevant materials to ascertain the congressional intent in en-
acting the GAO reporting requirement and to make certain recom-
mendations pertinent to the GAO's third report.
There is already considerable evidence that discrimination has re-
sulted from employer sanctions. For example, the GAO's second re-
port8 on employer sanctions issued in November 1988 reported that(1) 528,000 (or sixteen percent) of employers surveyed began or in-
creased discriminatory activity after the implementation of employer
sanctions,9 (2) at least 395 charges of IRCA-related discrimination
were filed with the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Re-
lated Unfair Employment Practices (OSC), the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and state and local human rights
agencies,' 0 and (3) nongovernmental groups, including civil and
human rights groups, have assembled numerous individual case stud-
ies documenting additional instances of IRCA-related discrimina-
tion.1 In addition, a study conducted by the New York State Inter-
Agency Task Force on Immigration Affairs estimated that there had
been at least 22,262 instances of sanctions-related discrimination in
the New York City metropolitan area. These results are supple-
mented by the report of the New York Immigration Hotline, which
receives approximately sixty calls per month regarding sanctions-re-
lated discrimination.
8. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: STATUS OF IM-
PLEMENTING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AFTER THE SECOND YEAR, No. GAO/66D-89-16
(Nov. 1988) [hereinafter SECOND GAO REPORT].
9. Id. at 46.
10. Id. at 40, 43.
11. Id. at 39.
Despite the magnitude of the discrimination uncovered by these
investigations, the GAO concluded in its second report that the data
did not demonstrate even a pattern of discrimination, much less a
"widespread" pattern.12
Analysis
The legislative history of the GAO mandate and the plain lan-
guage of the statute indicate that in preparing its first and second
reports, the GAO adopted an unduly stringent standard, limiting the
types of employment discrimination relevant to its inquiry, under-
stating the level of discrimination reflected in the data and requiring,
inter alia, quantification of the victims of any discrimination and evi-
dence of a wide geographic or cross-industry spread of discrimina-
tion. In fact, when properly analyzed under the less onerous standard
intended and enacted by Congress, the evidence collected by the
GAO in preparing its second report is more than sufficient to estab-
lish either a "pattern" or a "widespread pattern" of discrimination
resulting solely from employer sanctions.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of our analysis of the legislative history of IRCA and the
data available from the GAO and other groups Which are engaged in
monitoring the implementation of employer sanctions, the Commit-
tee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York makes the following recommendations:
1. The third GAO report should not restrict its inquiry to hiring
issues, but should attempt to assess the impact of employer sanctions
on a broad range of discriminatory practices, including hiring, firing,
recruiting and referral, wage disparities, promotions, harassment,
and workplace conditions. The GAO should review IRCA-related
EEOC charges that concern a broad range of discriminatory behav-
ior actionable under Title VII, 13 not only those cases where the per-
son was not hired or was fired. Similarly, in determining whether or
not charges filed with the OSC are sanctions-related, the GAO
should review case files that concern a broad range of sanctions-re-
lated employment discrimination. These are the types of discrimina-
tion that Congress sought to monitor when it enacted the GAO re-
porting provisions.
2. In conducting its inquiries, the GAO should focus on identifying
discriminatory policies as well as the victims of those policies. The
12. Id. at 60.
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 200e-2000e-17).
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existence of such policies, whether or not actual victims can be iden-
tified, constitutes relevant discrimination under the GAO's mandate.
This is consistent with the legislative history of the GAO's mandate
and conforms to the accepted construction of the term "discrimina-
tion" in other civil rights contexts.
3. As set out in the IRCA provisions governing the third GAO
report, the GAO should gather data concerning any discrimination
against "citizens or nationals of the United States or against eligible
workers,"' 4 and should not limit its inquiries to discrimination on the
basis of national origin. This is consistent with the plain language of
IRCA, the intent of Congress, and accepted principles of statutory
construction.
4. GAO inquiries should determine whether a nexus between em-
ployer sanctions and discriminatory activity exists and should not
rely exclusively on the particular date of November 6, 1986 for mak-
ing such a determination.
5. The GAO should make realistic extrapolations from the data it
collects through employer surveys, monitoring of newspaper adver-
tisements, employment "testing," individual case studies documented
by governmental and nongovernmental groups, job applicant surveys,
available social science surveys, and other methods of ascertaining
the level of discriminatory activity.
6. In assessing the results of its investigation to determine whether
or not a widespread pattern of discrimination has resulted from em-
ployer sanctions, the GAO should apply the standard enacted by
Congress-a low threshold which reflects congressional desire to re-
consider employer sanctions in the event that discrimination appears
to have resulted from their implementation.
7. Congress should not be seduced by the misguided argument
made by some that a national identity card or other work authoriza-
tion document is the logical way to combat discrimination. The im-
mediate and potential encroachments on civil liberties as well as the
costs represented by such unrealistic programs clearly outweigh any
benefits to be gained.
8. The evidence compiled by the GAO compels the conclusion that
employer sanctions have resulted in a widespread pattern of discrim-
ination. Moreover, this evidence is bolstered by additional evidence
compiled by interested groups across the country. In compliance with
its mandate, the GAO should certify the existence of a widespread
14. IRCA § 274A(l).
pattern of discrimination resulting from employer sanctions, trigger-
ing expedited congressional review. Upon such review, Congress
should repeal the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA.15
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed IRCA in the fall of 1986 after more than a dec-
ade of debate, much of which centered around the potential effects
of employer sanctions. As a direct result of Congress's concern that
employer sanctions might lead to increased discrimination against
certain authorized workers, section 274A(j)-(/) of IRCA directs the
GAO to monitor the effects of employer sanctions and triggers an
expedited congressional review of employer sanctions if they are
deemed to result in increased discrimination.16
Under this provision, the GAO is directed to prepare three annual
reports addressing the effects of employer sanctions. In each report,
the GAO is required to "make a specific determination as to whether
the implementation of [employer sanctions] has resulted'in a pattern
of discrimination in employment [against other than unauthorized
aliens] on the basis of national origin. ' ' 17 In addition, the third GAO
report must assess whether "a widespread pattern of discrimination
has resulted against citizens or nationals of the United States or
against eligible workers seeking employment solely from the imple-
mentation" of employer sanctions.18
In anticipation of the upcoming third GAO report, this Report of
the Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law in Part I reas-
sesses the data available through the GAO's second report and other
sources, concluding that this data supports a finding of a "wide-
spread pattern of discrimination" resulting from employer sanctions.
In Part II, we review the GAO's narrowly-gauged research design
and recommend specific changes dictated by the broad scope of the
GAO's mandate. We then examine the statutory language and legis-
lative history of the GAO's mandate to ascertain the congressional
intent behind the enactment of the reporting requirement. Finally, in
Part III, because of the significant civil liberties issues and potential
for abuse, we reject the suggestion that a national identity card or
15. Two members of the Committee, Noel Ferris, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, Southern District of New York, and Carlyle M. Dunaway, Jr., dissented from the
last sentence only, i.e., from the recommendation that sanctions be repealed. They con-
curred with the balance of paragraph eight and all of the other recommendations.
16. On the basis of the third GAO report, the employer sanctions and/or antidis-
crimination provisions could be repealed if Congress enacts a joint resolution within 30
days of the GAO report, stating in substance that it approves the GAO's findings. IRCA
§ 274A(l)(I)(A).
17. IRCA § 274A(j)(2).
18. IRCA § 274A(I)(A).
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similar identification program be implemented to address such
discrimination.
PART I: THE DATA COLLECTED TO DATE DEMONSTRATES A
WIDESPREAD PATTERN OF DISCRIMINATION
A. The GAO's Second Report
The GAO's second report on employer sanctions reported that: (1)
528,000 (or sixteen percent) of employers surveyed began or in-
creased discriminatory activity after the implementation of employer
sanctions (including an estimated 53,000 employers in California);19
(2) at least 395 charges of IRCA-related discrimination were filed
with the OSC, EEOC, and state and local human rights agencies;20
and (3) nongovernmental civil rights, immigrants, and refugee rights
groups had assembled numerous individual case studies documenting
additional instances of IRCA-related discrimination. The GAO ob-
tained some data through its own surveys of employers and collected
the remainder from other governmental and nongovernmental
entities.
In assessing the assembled data, the GAO concluded that "the
results of the survey cannot be relied on to show if the law has
caused a pattern of discrimination because the responses to the sur-
vey questions cannot be verified or further refined so as to indicate
the extent and impact of the practices."2 1 The formal charges of dis-
crimination and documented case studies were likewise deemed in-
sufficient to establish a pattern of discrimination.22
19. The GAO suggests that an increase in discrimination might result merely from
the increase, under IRCA, of the portion of the nation's employers subject to federal
antidiscrimination laws. However, since the GAO's surveys specifically measure new dis-
crimination adopted in anticipation of or in response to employer sanctions, the GAO has
effectively controlled its results for the increase in the number of regulated employers.
See SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
20. This number very likely understates the number of relevant charges filed. As
discussed infra, the GAO improperly limited its re iew to only those EEOC charges
arising from hiring and firing. Similarly, the GAO's unduly narrow view of its mandate
reduced its tally of relevant OSC claims. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
21. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 39. In contrast, the GAO reports
concerning the effectiveness of employer sanctions in other countries were based solely on
surveys of government officials, without any independent review of the laws, yet the GAO
did not question their reliability. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL
ALIENS: INFORMATION ON SELECTED COUNTRIES' EMPLOYMENT PROHIBITION LAWS
(1985); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF
LAWS REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (1982).
22. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 39. In general, the Second GAO Re-
port gave too little weight to the valid inferences regarding increased discrimination
In fact, assessed under the proper standard, the data set out in the
Second GAO Report does indicate a widespread pattern of discrimi-
nation. Moreover, an examination of the Second GAO Report sug-
gests that the GAO seriously underestimated the level of discrimina-
tory activity.
As discussed more fully below, the legislative history of the GAO's
mandate indicates that the phrase "widespread pattern of discrimi-
nation" was intended to establish a low threshold, ensuring that
Congress would review the impact of employer sanctions in the event
that any significant discrimination resulted from sanctions.2 The
data collected by the GAO itself establishes that at least
528,000-about one out of every six-employers surveyed adopted
discriminatory practices as a result of sanctions, in addition to the
considerable evidence of individual instances of discrimination docu-
mented by the OSC, EEOC, and other governmental and nongovern-
mental groups.24 Even considered independently, either the survey
evidence or the documented case studies would meet the standard
enacted by Congress to establish a "widespread pattern of discrimi-
nation.12 5 In combination, this multi-faceted evidence demonstrates
that the new discrimination is sufficient to trigger expedited review
of employer sanctions under IRCA and to require the repeal of sanc-
tions by Congress.
B. Additional Data Also Indicates a Widespread
Pattern of Discrimination
The data indicating a widespread pattern of discrimination set out
in the GAO's second report is augmented and verified by additional
evidence collected by many interested groups, including the New
York State Inter-Agency Task Force on Immigration Affairs, which
has chronicled the development of a widespread pattern of discrimi-
nation in New York resulting from employer sanctions.2 6 Based on
telephone surveys of a selected stratum of 400 employers in the New
York City metropolitan area-an area chosen because of its concen-
tration of immigrants-the Task Force concluded, inter alia, that
(1) in 942,313 of the area jobs where the 1-9 is used, employers have
difficulty determining what documents are allowable under the verifi-
which can be drawn from the documented case studies provided by civil rights, immi-
grants' rights, and refugee service groups. Id.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 94-105.
24. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 39.
25. See Catlett v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1265
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1574 (1988) (either statistics or nonstatistical
evidence "alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination").
26. NEw YORK STATE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS,
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
OF 1986: A STUDY OF IMPACTS ON NEW YORKERS (1988).
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cation provisions of IRCA,27 (2) 977,213 area jobs are in workplaces
where employment is unjustifiably denied to individuals until they
produce appropriate documents,2 s and (3) seven percent of area em-
ployers selectively screen potential employees, requiring only those
who look foreign or "risky" to produce work authorization docu-
ments.2 9 The Task Force estimated that "there have been at least
22,262 cases in which people were either temporarily denied work or
not hired by an employer" as a result of employer sanctions."0
The New York State Task Force also reviewed case studies pro-
vided by forty-six organizations, yielding about 168 detailed, individ-
ual cases of discrimination arising from the implementation of em-
ployer sanctions. Forty-three percent of these cases involved
individuals with work authorization status who were simply refused
employment, presumably because they appeared "risky" to employ-
ers concerned about employer sanctions. The remaining fifty-seven
percent of the cases were refugees and asylees, authorized to work,
but whose documents appeared illegitimate to potential employers. 31
The Task Force observed that
[t]he case studies compiled from community organization interviews con-
sistently present the dilemma of authorized workers unable to acquire or
maintain employment due to lack of confidence by employers in the work
authorization documents presented or loss of employment due to expiration
of temporary work authorization documents, which may be extended by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) upon request. 32
Based upon this data, the New York State Task Force concluded
that "for the purposes of Congressional review of the impact of em-
ployer sanctions as currently implemented a 'widespread pattern of
discrimination' has been documented in New York."33 The Task
Force further called upon the GAO to monitor "the various ways in
which United States citizens and alien workers have suffered hard-
ship in the workplace, [including] non-acceptance of certain docu-
ments and refusal to allow job applicants grace periods to permit
further documentation." 4
In addition to the Task Force's work, the New York Immigration
Hotline reports that it receives approximately sixty calls per month
27. Id. at S.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6-7.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id.
with inquiries regarding sanctions-related discrimination. 5 As Rus-
sell Pearce of the New York City Commission on Human Rights
observed during the Symposium, this is more than the average num-
ber of employment discrimination complaints which the Commission
received in 1988 for all legally protected classes combined.3" More-
over, the numbers of calls received by hotlines and immigrants'
groups are a fraction of the true number of violations, most of which
are never reported because of ignorance or fear.3 7
C. Critique of the GAO's Research Design
The clear evidence that a widespread pattern of discrimination has
resulted from IRCA's employer sanctions is bolstered by the fact
that, in all likelihood, the GAO underestimated the level of discrimi-
natory activity represented by its data. There are two explanations
for this: first, the GAO relied on an inappropriately narrow definition
of its mandate, and second, the GAO failed to make reasonable ex-
trapolations from its data.
As discussed more fully in Part II of this Report, the definitions
used by the GAO in preparing its second report caused the GAO to
underestimate the actual impact of employer sanctions. In its second
report, for example, the GAO indicates that those charges it consid-
ered to be related to employer sanctions were generally those which
included information in the allegation directly related to the 1-9 pro-
cess-a requirement which excludes a significant number of sanc-
tions-related charges. 38 A reassessment of OSC charges under an ap-
35. Helen Lauffer, Testimony of the New York Immigration Hotline Before the
Public Hearing on National Origin and Immigrant Discrimination, at 2 (Nov. 15, 1988).
36. Symposium, supra note 7, at 51 (remarks of Russell Pearce).
37. Data compiled by the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development suggest that despite comparable levels
of discrimination, Hispanics are less likely than other minorities to file discrimination
complaints. Joint Hearing on the Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments
Act of 1986 (H.R. 3810) Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Dev. &
Select Comm. on Aging of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 211-37, 304-34 (1986) (statement of Charles Kamasaki, Director of
Policy Analysis, National Council of La Raza).
38. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 41. The GAO offers the following
example of an OSC charge which it deems to be not related to sanctions: "an allegation
by a newly legalized worker that an employer fired him because the employer preferred
to hire only unauthorized aliens." Id. However, if the employer began or increased his
illegal policy of preferring unauthorized aliens after, or in anticipation of, the implemen-
tation of employer sanctions, it can be assumed that the employer adopted that policy
because sanctions created new opportunities for exploitation of undocumented workers.
See, e.g., Francoeur v. Corroon & Black Co., 552 F. Supp. 403, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(presumption of retaliation when employee was fired shortly after EEOC filing). If that
is the case, the charge filed by the legalized worker does constitute an example of dis-
crimination against an eligible worker resulting from employer sanctions. Several speak-
ers at the Symposium indicated that the type of policy described in the GAO's example
is an unintended consequence of employer sanctions, resulting in the inhumane exploita-
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propriate definition of discrimination would likely yield additional
instances of sanctions-related discrimination pertinent to the GAO's
third report.
In its second report, the GAO also adopted an unduly narrow view
of relevant discrimination in its examination of EEOC filings. The
GAO states that it examined only those IRCA-related charges
"where the person was not hired or was fired."39 In preparing its
third report, the GAO should examine charges filed with the EEOC
that allege any mode of employment discrimination resulting from
employer sanctions.
Similarly, the GAO employer surveys used to collect data for the
second report asked only whether an employer's discriminatory activ-
ity "started or increased. .. since November 7."' o This question fails
to address the possibility that employers may have adopted discrimi-
natory policies in anticipation of employer sanctions. Future inquir-
ies should continue to emphasize the nexus between discriminatory
practices and the implementation of employer sanctions, but should
not focus solely on November 7, 1986, since the prospect of sanc-
tions, which were widely (and inaccurately) publicized prior to their
formal commencement, may have caused employers to adopt such
practices prior to that date.
The GAO's second report also did not make adequate use of, or
draw reasonable conclusions from, the collected data. For example,
in its second report, the GAO estimated that twenty-two percent, or
900,000, of the employers it surveyed were not aware of the laws
relating to employer sanctions."1 An additional 60,000 to 300,000
employers did not clearly understand one or more of IRCA's major
42provisions. And of those employers who were aware of the law,
958,000 (or fifty percent) had not complied with the 1-9 require-
ment, often because they did not understand the document verifica-
tion law.' It is clear that an incomplete understanding of IRCA's
tion of the undocumented workers. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 7, at 167-68 (re-
marks of Kitty Calavita, Professor, Program in Social Ecology at the University of Cali-
fornia at Irvine).
39. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 20.
40. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at app. II.
41. In addition, the GAO discovered that a substantial proportion of the state and
local agencies surveyed were unfamiliar with IRCA's antidiscrimination provisions and
did not even have OSC's forms to use in filing a charge. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra
note 8, at 39, 55.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 22, 27. These general results were confirmed by a Nustate, Inc. study of
employers in Texas and California, which showed that 56% of employers surveyed knew
provisions might well cause employers to give differential treatment
to certain eligible workers based on misunderstandings or partial
knowledge of their responsibilities under IRCA; they are unlikely to
be familiar with work authorization documents, the grandfather pro-
visions, or the provisions of IRCA designed to protect those who
need time to obtain documents. In its second report, however, the
GAO drew no conclusions from this dramatic evidence of employers'
incomplete understanding of the law. Similarly, it failed to acknowl-
edge that differential treatment resulting from an incomplete under-
standing of IRCA constitutes discrimination.44
It is probable, moreover, that the survey underrepresents the ac-
tual level of employment discrimination. At the very least, those em-
ployers who intentionally discriminate would not be expected to ad-
mit to their wrongdoing in response to the survey, yet the GAO
made no note of this fact.
Further, the GAO reported that it detected seventy-eight instances
where employers advertised an illegal United States-Citizens-Only
hiring policy in five major city newspapers.45 The second report,
however, does not indicate the size or type of these employers, nor
does the GAO draw the obvious conclusion that many other employ-
ers outside of these five major cities or advertising in other venues
are likely adopting similar policies.
The OSC also reports that several cases which it initiated, and
which ultimately settled, involved multinational corporations that
had engaged in sanctions-related discrimination against hundreds of
employees and potential employees.46 Many of the cases filed with
the OSC and the EEOC represent multiple violations in a single
workplace, yet were apparently given little weight by the GAO.47
Even without extrapolation, however, the data collected to date
indicates a "widespread pattern of discrimination." In its second re-
port, the GAO has documented discrimination that is indisputably
more than sporadic. Discrimination has also been independently doc-
"just a few details" about IRCA. Id. at 25.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 106-13.
45. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
46. Symposium, supra note 7, at 108 (remarks of Lawrence J. Siskind, Special
Counsel for Unfair Immigration Related Employment Practices, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
See Department of Justice Press Release (Jan. 6, 1989) (OSC settlement with BDM
Corporation); Department of Justice Press Release (Nov. 29, 1988) (OSC settlement
with Northrop Corporation); Department of Justice Press Release (Aug. 8, 1988) (OSC
settlement with American Airlines). At the Symposium, Richard Larson, Counsel to the
Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, raised the question of how the GAO would
treat such claims. Symposium, supra note 7, at 109-16 (remarks of Richard Larson).
Clearly, counting these claims as a single instance of discrimination would improperly
minimize their significance. The American Airlines policy, for instance, directly affected
at least 33 individuals. Department of Justice Press Release (Aug. 8, 1988) (OSC settle-
ment with American Airlines).
47. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 60.
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umented in particular industries in Los Angeles County48 and among
particular employers in the New York City metropolitan area.49 A
fair reading of IRCA requires that the GAO certify in its third re-
port that employer sanctions have resulted in a "widespread pattern
of discrimination" against eligible workers. As a matter of sound
public policy and in recognition of the dire effects this law has had
on hundreds of thousands of citizens and documented workers, Con-
gress should respond by repealing employer sanctions.
PART II: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GAO REPORTING
REQUIREMENT
A. Purpose and Context of the Reporting Requirement
An analysis of the legislative history of IRCA indicates that the
GAO's mandate in section 274A(j)-(l) should be expansively inter-
preted to enable meaningful congressional review of evidence of new
discrimination resulting from employer sanctions. This interpretation
of the GAO mandate is illuminated by the relationship of section
274A(j)-(l) to two of IRCA's major sections, the employer sanctions
and antidiscrimination provisions.
The employer sanctions provision, section 274A, establishes that it
is "unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer
for a fee, for employment in the United States [any unauthorized
alien]."5 It is also unlawful knowingly to retain an employee who is
or has become unauthorized to work or knowingly to obtain the ser-
vices of an unauthorized alien through contract." A series of gradu-
ated penalties are imposed for violations of this section, with the
prospect of criminal sanctions if an employer engages in a "pattern
or practice" of unauthorized employment.52
As part of IRCA's employer sanctions scheme, employers must
ask each new employee to provide documents establishing his or her
48. This evidence was gathered by the Coalition for Humane Immigration Rights
of Los Angeles (CHIRLA). See Symposium, supra note 7, at 49-54 (remarks of Anne
Kamsvaag, Coalition for Humane Immigration Rights of Los Angeles). COALITION FOR
HUMANE IMMIGRATION RIGHTS OF Los ANGELES, PRELIMINARY REPORT: THE EFFECTS
OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS ON WORKERS (1988).
49. See discussion of New York State Task Force Report and New York Immigra-
tion Hotline, supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
50. IRCA § 274A(a)(1).
51. Under a grandfather clause in the statute, however, an employer may continue
to employ unauthorized aliens who were hired before November 6, 1986. IRCA §
274A(n)(3).
52. IRCA §§ 274(e),(f).
employment authorization within three days of hiring. 53 The em-
ployer must then retain for three years after hiring or one year after
termination, whichever is later, records of the employee's identifica-
tion information on the 1-9 form. These forms are subject to inspec-
tion by the INS and Department of Labor.54 Failure to comply with
the record-keeping requirement is punishable by fines ranging from
$100 to $1,000 per job applicant.5
The antidiscrimination provisions, section 274B of IRCA, were
added to the final House .version of the immigration bill in October
1986.56 Proposed by Representative Barney Frank (D. Mass.), the
"Frank Amendment" responded to concerns of legislators, minority
groups, and civil rights advocates that employer sanctions and the
related verification requirements would lead to increased employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of citizenship or national origin.
Members of Congress feared that many employers might simply at-
tempt to avoid the risk of sanctions altogether by discharging or fail-
ing to hire "individuals who appear 'foreign,' whether by name, race
or accent."'57 Of particular concern were industries such as manufac-
turing, farming, and other employers with large numbers of foreign
employees.58
Section 274B attempts to fill the gaps in existing civil rights laws
by providing additional protection to authorized aliens. Under the
section, an employer may not discharge or refuse to hire, recruit, or
refer for a fee "any individual (other than an unauthorized alien)"
on grounds of national origin or citizenship status.5 9 The section also
creates a separate administrative entity, the OSC, to investigate vio-
lations and bring complaints. 0 Individuals may bring private actions
if the OSC opts not to pursue their claims. 61
53. IRCA § 274A(b); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii) (1988).
54. IRCA § 274A(b)(3).
55. IRCA § 274A(e)(5).
56. The antidiscrimination provisions were initially proposed in 1983. See 129
CONG. REC. 12,556 (1983). They were subsequently adopted by the House-Senate Con-
ference Committee and passed by both Houses. See 132 CONG. REC. H1O,598-99 (daily
ed. Oct. 15, 1986); 132 CONG. REC. S16,915 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986). See generally Eig
& Vialet, Comprehensive Immigration Reform: History and Current Status, I GEo. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 27 (1985).
57. Antidiscrimination Provision of H.R. 3080: Joint Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees & Internat'l Law of the House Judiciary Comm. &
Subcomm. on Immigration & Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. 111 (1985) (statement of Rep. Garcia).
58. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (garment industry); Babula v.
INS, 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981) (factory); Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,
659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982) (restaurant).
59. IRCA § 274B(a)(1). An employer may, however, prefer an individual United
States citizen over an alien on a case-by-case basis if the two are "equally qualified."
IRCA §§ 274B(a)(2)(c), (4).
60. IRCA § 274B.
61. IRCA § 274B(d)(2).
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While section 274B provides opportunities for redress of identifi-
able instances of discrimination, it does not address the possibility
that employer sanctions may lead to a more general increase in dis-
crimination. That possibility is instead the subject of the GAO moni-
toring requirement, which provides for congressional review of em-
ployer sanctions in the event that they result in a "widespread
pattern of discrimination."
The particular mechanism and specific language of the GAO re-
porting requirement is the product of compromise during the final
days of Congress's consideration of the immigration bill. One group
of legislators favored an automatic "sunset" provision for employer
sanctions which, they argued, would force Congress to face up to any
new discrimination resulting from sanctions; an automatic sunset
would place the burden on Congress to disprove assertions of new
discrimination if it wished to perpetuate employer sanctions beyond
the sunset. As spokesperson for this viewpoint, Senator Edward Ken-
nedy (D. Mass.) proposed an automatic sunset provision numerous
times during the years of Senate debate of immigration reform.
Each time, however, it was defeated by legislators who felt that since
employer sanctions are central to IRCA's scheme to deter illegal im-
migration, an automatic sunset was too drastic a response to the
mere possibility of increased discrimination.62
An automatic sunset provision was also voted down during early
debates of the immigration bill in the House.63 Nevertheless, both
Houses of Congress did adopt early versions of IRCA requiring peri-
odic review of employer sanctions-by the President, the Civil
Rights Commission, and the GAO-to determine whether sanctions
resulted in increased discrimination.64
In 1985, Senator Kennedy proposed to augment these monitoring
provisions with a modified sunset that would simply trigger congres-
sional review of employer sanctions in the event that the GAO found
62. See 128 CONG. REc. 21,013 (1982); S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), to accompany S. 529, 4/21/83 (minority views of Sen. Kennedy) at 134-35.
63. See 130 CONG. REC. 16,195 (1984) (rejecting Rep. Schroeder's proposal for a
three-year automatic sunset on sanctions).
64. 128 CONG. REC. 21,013 (1982) (accepting Kennedy Amendment requiring
GAO reports on discrimination); H.R. REP. No. 890, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 44
(1982) (President and Civil Rights Commission to monitor "any pattern of discrimina-
tion"); S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (President and GAO to monitor
"any pattern of discrimination... against eligible workers"); H.R. REP. No. 115, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 47 (1983) (President, Civil Rights Commission, and new task
force to monitor discrimination).
a widespread pattern of discrimination in its third annual report.6 5
The Kennedy Amendment was narrowly rejected by the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee but Kennedy re-introduced the amendment on
the Senate floor and it was adopted.6 Both the Senate and House
versions of the immigration bill were then considered by the House-
Senate Conference Committee. Weighing the Kennedy Amendment
against the automatic six-and-a-half year sunset on employer sanc-
tions proposed by the House legislators,67 the Conference Committee
opted for the Senate version.68
The Committee's rejection of an automatic sunset did not reflect
acceptance of an increased level of employment discrimination, but a
decision not to anticipate such discrimination before sanctions had
been implemented. Representative Daniel Lungren (R. Cal.) later
described the Conference Committee's reasoning as follows:
Employer sanctions are obviously at the heart of the enforcement thrust .of
the legislation. Hence, an automatic sunset provision was not acceptable to
most of the Republican members [of Congress] as well as to the Senate
Conferees. The approach adopted by the Senate had been crafted by Sena-
tor Kennedy and was directly tied to the question of discrimination. The
problem in the House bill was that it could give rise to a sunset regardless
of whether discrimination was found to exist. Under such a formulation, it
would have been possible to have a significant legislation program without
any assurance that the major enforcement provision of the bill would en-
dure. The symmetry created by the dual tracks of legislation and enforce-
ment would be destroyed. Aside from the public policy questions raised by
the amendment, it was most unlikely that such an approach could have
passed the Senate. In the end, the Senate provisions were adopted."9
This view of the GAO reporting requirement comports with the
theme sounded by congressional leaders again and again as they
were considering the possible effects of employer sanctions-that
Congress wanted to create a trigger for further consideration of
sanctions in the event that sanctions resulted in discrimination. Sena-
tor Bingaman (D. N.M.), for example, observed when voting to ap-
prove the Conference Report on the immigration bill that "[t]he
compromise, by adopting the Senate provision [concerning GAO Re-
ports], guarantees at a minimum that we revisit the issue of em-
ployer sanctions."70
In sum, the legislative history of the GAO reporting requirement
indicates that Congress wanted to reassess employer sanctions in the
65. S. REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1985) (minority views of Sen.
Kennedy); 131 CONG. REc. 23,320-21 (1985).
66. 131 CoNG. REc. 23,717-20 (1985); S. 1200, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S.
REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 121 (1986).
67. See H.R. Res. 580, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. D1284 (daily ed.
Oct. 8, 1986).
68. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1986).
69. Lungren, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 24 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 277, 288-89 (1987).
70. 132 CONG. REC. S16,894 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (emphasis added).
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event of increased discrimination and wanted a mechanism to trigger
that re-evaluation. It was not Congress's intention to enact an impos-
sibly high threshold for a GAO finding of "a widespread pattern of
discrimination." Instead, Congress recognized that it has a height-
ened responsibility to monitor discriminatory effects of employer
sanctions since such effects are, by definition, byproducts of congres-
sional action.7 ' The legislative history discussed above demonstrates
that, in recognition of its special role and responsibility, Congress
intended to enact a mechanism whereby it would be alerted to any
increase in discrimination resulting from sanctions.
B. Interpretation of the GAO Mandate
In addition to this contextual evidence, an expansive interpretation
of the GAO reporting mandate is supported by the congressional de-
bate of the statutory phrase "widespread pattern of discrimination"
resulting "solely" from employer sanctions.
1. What is "Discrimination"?
a. Scope of Discrimination
In carrying out its mandate, the GAO must begin with an under-
standing of what types of discrimination are relevant to its task. The
statute itself provides a clear definition: "discrimination" in the con-
text of section 274A(l) includes, at the very least, all discriminatory
practices in employment directed against "citizens or nationals of
the United States or against eligible workers" that are linked to em-
ployer sanctions.7 2 This unambiguous language of the GAO mandate
indicates that when Congress accepted the modified sunset provision,
it intended the scope of the third report to include all forms of em-
ployment discrimination.73  Any other reading of IRCA section
274A(l)(1)(A) violates the "plain meaning rule" and undermines
71. See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
72. IRCA § 274A(/). The GAO has taken the position that its mandate extends
only to discrimination in employment. Symposium, supra note 7, at 124 (remarks of
Alan Stapleton, Group Director, General Government Division, U.S. GAO).
73. Compare IRCA § 274A(j)(2) and IRCA, § 274A(J)(1)(A). Despite this un-
ambiguous statutory language, Senator Simpson has indicated his belief that the GAO's
mandate with respect to the third report excludes "alienage" discrimination. 131 CONG.
REc. 23,710 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simpson). Senator Simpson's interpretation of the
GAO's mandate is, however, at odds with the plain language of the statute and is contra-
dicted by the statements of Senator Kennedy, the chief sponsor of the modified sunset
provision.
the statutory language by failing to give effect to each word in the
statute.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the legislative his-
tory suggested that the GAO's mandate extended only to national
origin discrimination rather than citizenship discrimination as well,
"the legislative history of a statute may not compel a construction at
variance with its plain words." 5 Where, as here, the statute's lan-
guage is unambiguous, the legislative history is irrelevant to its con-
struction.76 Moreover, looking beyond the statute's plain words to the
congressional debate, it is evident that this narrow. reading of the
GAO's mandate does not reflect the consensus of members of
Congress.
In fact, Congress's overriding concern was its responsibility to
avoid passing legislation which resulted in any increase in discrimi-
nation against eligible workers. As Senator Kennedy stated during
the 1983 debate, "I believe we must be extremely cautious to avoid
any legislative action that raises the level of intolerance and discrim-
ination in our society."7 This position was echoed by Senator John
Glenn (D. Ohio), who observed that "in enacting [employer sanc-
tions] into law, we assume a great responsibility to insure that they
do not in practice result in discrimination based on national origin or
alien status." ' 8 With that legislative intent in mind, Representative
Peter W. Rodino (D. N.J.) noted that the purpose of the reports was
simply to "reveal whether sanctions work, whether they result in dis-
crimination and whether the antidiscrimination mechanism has been
effective in responding to discriminatory conduct."7 9 His views com-
port with Senator Kennedy's statements that the provisions relating
to expedited review of employer sanctions were designed to address
"any unintended discrimination" arising from the implementation of
employer sanctions.80 In sum, the GAO's third report should give
full effect to the statutory language of the GAO mandate by report-
74. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163 (1982)
(statute must be construed so that all of its parts are given effect); J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1984) ("effect must be given, if
possible, to every word").
75. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 151 (1974); see also Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("[a]bsent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, [the statutory language] must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive").
76. 73 Am. JUR. 2D Statutes § 194 (1974); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
432 n.12 (1987) ("[W]here no ambiguity appears, it has been presumed conclusively
that the clear and explicit terms of a statute express the legislative intention.").
77. 129 CONG. REC. 10,188 (1983) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
78. 129 CONG. REC. 12,592 (1983) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
79. 132 CONG. REC. H10,584 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Rodino).
80. 131 CONG. REc. 23,717 (1985); see also S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
134-35 (1983) (minority views of Sen. Kennedy).
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ing on both national origin and citizenship discrimination arising
from employer sanctions.
In addition, the third report should examine a wide range of em-
ployment-related discrimination, not just discrimination relating to
hiring or firing of eligible workers. This reading of the statute is sup-
ported by the congressional debate concerning sanctions, which re-
flects legislators' wide-ranging concerns that sanctions might lead to
increased discrimination not only in hiring, but also through discrim-
inatory enforcement of documentation requirements and more gen-
eral exploitation of authorized workers. Senator Kennedy repeatedly
indicated that he offered the GAO reporting amendment "[t]o as-
sure that Congress will not ignore any discrimination that arises in
the implementation of employer sanctions." 81 Senator DeConcini (D.
Ariz.), who voted against the Conference Committee report because
of his continued opposition to employer sanctions, specifically de-
scribed the types of discrimination which he feared would result
from sanctions:
I am concerned that an employer would have a slightly higher employment
standard for an individual with a Hispanic surname simply because that
employer would want to avoid any chance of having to pay a fine or go tojail. I am concerned that an employer would develop different procedures
for interviewing and hiring foreign-looking and sounding individuals. For
instance, an employer might verify the employment eligibility of a Japa-
nese-American before the interview process begins and check on the Anglo-
American after the hiring decision has already been made.82
All of these modes of employment discrimination, whether or not
the affected individual is ultimately hired or fired, were of concern to
Congress and should be assessed and reported by the GAO under
section 274A(j). With the passage of employer sanctions, Congress
for the first time enacted a law that risks engendering new discrimi-
nation. Congress cannot now close its eyes to certain types of dis-
crimination by arguing that conduct which is concededly discrimina-
tory is not technically encompassed within the GAO mandate. If
there is discrimination resulting from employer sanctions, it must be
acknowledged and addressed, not minimized by narrowly defining
the GAO's mandate.
81. 129 CONG. REC. 10,188-89 (1983) (emphasis added).
82. 132 CONG. REC. S16,879-80 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986); see also 128 CONG.
REC. 23,514-15 (1982) (Rep. Schroeder (D. Col.) expressing concern about exploitation
of workers); 130 CONG. REc. 9056-57 (1984) (Rep. Berman (D. Cal.) describing ex-
ploitative effects of sanctions in California).
b. Policies Versus Victims
In its second report on employer sanctions, the GAO emphasized
the perceived need to identify the victims of discriminatory policies
in order to determine whether "widespread discrimination" is occur-
ring.83 For example, despite the findings that sixteen percent of em-
ployers surveyed engaged in unlawful practices, the GAO states that
[tihere is no data on the number of persons who applied for the estimated
67.5 million jobs filled in a given year who were not hired because of em-
ployers' fear of sanctions. Without this information, we may not be able to
determine what is a "widespread pattern" of discrimination versus "no sig-
nificant" discrimination. 84
The view that victims must be identified is not warranted by the
GAO's mandate. In analogous civil rights contexts, discrimination is
generally proved when a discriminatory policy is identified. The iden-
tification of victims, while perhaps necessary to establish standing
and useful in assessing damages, is not a requisite to determining the
existence of discrimination.8
For example, in the Title VII case of Trans World Airlines v.
Thurston, the plaintiff presented direct evidence that TWA had
adopted a policy that linked employment promotions directly to age,
thus discriminating against those over age sixty.86 The Supreme
Court found for the plaintiff and struck down the TWA policy, with-
out requiring any proof that the policy affected individual employ-
ees. 87 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,88
another Title VII case, the Supreme Court cited Senator Hubert
Humphrey's statement during congressional debate of the "pattern
and practice" requirement:
There would be a pattern or practice if, for example, a number of compa-
nies or persons in the same industry or line of business discriminated, if a
chain of motels or restaurants practiced racial discrimination throughout all
or a significant part of the system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly
engaged in acts prohibited by the statute.89
Senator Humphrey's definition is noteworthy because he specifically
describes the quantum of evidence of employers' practices necessary
83. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
84. Id. at 17.
85. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342-43
n.24 (1977). This approach to discrimination is not altered by the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), which
instead dealt with the quantum of proof required to establish the existence of discrimina-
tory policies.
86. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
87. Id. at 120 n.15; see also Lowe v. Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, as amended, 784
F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (discriminatory statement of personnel manager and fact that
no blacks employed on police force constituted direct evidence of discriminatory policy).
88. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
89. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.16 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964)).
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to constitute a "pattern," without mention of any need to identify
victims.
As a legal matter, "discrimination" may be established through
the identification of discriminatory policies, without proof of the
number of victims of those policies. 90 This is particularly true where
the victims include potential job applicants, deterred by discrimina-
tory practices from even applying. As noted by the Supreme Court,
"[a] consistently enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job
applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to
subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejec-
tion." 91 Courts have taken a similar approach in cases assessing
housing policies under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), striking down
discriminatory practices without requiring proof that potential resi-
dents were turned away or deterred from applying.92
In carrying out its mandate under IRCA, the GAO's task is to use
social science to determine whether or not there is a widespread pat-
tern of discrimination, an undertaking that is much broader than as-
sessing individual claims arising under Title VII or the FHA. Yet
even cases under those statutes hold that the existence of discrimina-
tory policies is sufficient to prove discrimination.93 In accordance
with the legislative history of IRCA and the evidence gleaned from
judicial construction of the term "discrimination" in the civil rights
context, the GAO should focus on discriminatory employment poli-
cies linked to employer sanctions without regard to the ability to ac-
tually identify particular individual victims of such policies.
90. See, e.g., EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) (identification of policies
and affected groups sufficient to sustain EEOC charge of "pattern or practice" of
discrimination).
91. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 365; see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115, 2122 n.7 (1989) (citing Teamsters with approval); see also Ratliffe v. Governor's
Highway Safety Program, 791 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1986) (nonapplicant not barred
from recovering under Title VII); Lams v. General Waterworks Corp., 766 F.2d 386,
393 (8th Cir. 1985) (no proof of application required when employer policies discouraged
plaintiffs from applying).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982); see United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp.,
437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971) (number of blacks actually turned away or discriminated
against was not determinative of FHA pattern or practice violation); United States v.
Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (D. Miss. 1972) (number of blacks rejected is
not determinative of pattern or practice in FHA case).
93. See supra notes 91, 92 and accompanying text.
2. What is a "Widespread Pattern" of Discrimination?
In its second report, the GAO suggested that the phrase "wide-
spread pattern" requires a finding that discrimination has a non-
random distribution through certain regions or industries. 4 How-
ever, the legislative history of IRCA indicates that the phrase
"widespread pattern" in the Kennedy Amendment does not set so
high or particularized a standard.
In fact, the legislative history of this provision indicates that much
less evidence of discrimination than that already uncovered by the
GAO is sufficient to establish a "widespread pattern of discrimina-
tion" under the GAO mandate. Congress contemplated that a geo-
graphic spread of discriminatory practices, a spread of such practices
across a spectrum of industries, a concentration of discrimination in
certain areas of the country or certain industries, or a significant in-
crease in discriminatory activity, regardless of distribution, would all
constitute a "widespread pattern" for purposes of the third GAO re-
port.95 As Senator Kennedy stated on the Senate floor,
[t]his amendment simply offers a guarantee, built into the statute, that
Congress can act expeditiously to rectify any unintended discrimination. If,
contrary to all the protections and intentions contained in the bill, new job
discrimination does develop and not just a few isolated cases of discrimina-
tion, but a widespread pattern of discrimination then Congress can sunset
employer sanctions."6
Senator Kennedy further indicated that he offered the amendment to
ensure that "if a serious pattern of discrimination emerges, Congress
will not ignore it."9 7 Senator Levin stated that the bill provides "for
a review and possible phase-out of employer sanctions if discrimina-
tion becomes a serious problem." 98
94. SECOA4D GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 47.
95. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. 15,938-39 (1984) (Rep. Bartlett discussing concen-
tration of discrimination in Southwest United States); 128 CONG. REC. 27,483-85 (1982)
(Rep. Schroeder noting that "undocumented workers are concentrated in industries that
employ large numbers of menial workers, such as restaurants, agribusiness, and the gar-
ment industry"). In designing its research scheme, the GAO has apparently proceeded on
the assumption that a uniform nationwide distribution of discrimination is not necessary
to trigger the modified sunset provisions. Thus, the GAO has concentrated its survey
efforts in selected states and cities, SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 18-19, re-
viewed EEOC charges only in selected cities, id. at 20, and stratified its samples to em-
phasize certain industries. Id. at 18-19.
96. 131 CONG. REC. 23,717 (1985) (emphasis added). On another occasion, Sena-
tor Kennedy noted that "[i]f no discrimination materializes, then under my amendment,
sanctions will be continued." 131 CONG. REc. 23,321 (1985) (emphasis added). Ken-
nedy's statement echoes Senator Humphrey's view of what constitutes a "pattern or
practice" violation: "The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination
by a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice." Teamsters, 431
U.S. 324, 336-37 (1976) (citing 110 CONG. REc. 14,270 (1964)); see supra text accom-
panying notes 88-89.
97. 131 CONG. REc. 23,321 (1985) (emphasis added).
98. 132 CONG. REC. S16,907 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (emphasis added).
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The term "pattern" is given a similar construction under the
FHA, Title VII, the Voting Rights Act,99 and the criminal penalty
provisions of IRCA. 100 Each of these statutes prohibits a "pattern or
practice" of discrimination and adopts the phrase's generic meaning:
"regular, repeated and intentional activities. . .[not] isolated, spo-
radic or accidental acts."' 01 The Supreme Court construed this stan-
dard in Teamsters, where it cited Senator Humphrey's statement
that a "pattern" might be established through the discriminatory
practices of "a number of companies or persons in the same industry
or line of business.'"102
This definition of "pattern" has been applied quite literally by
courts, particularly in suits under the FHA. For example, in Havens
Realty Corporation v. Coleman,10 3 the Supreme Court stated that
five incidents of discrimination might constitute a "continuing pat-
tern" sufficient to extend the statute of limitations period for FHA
claims. Similarly, in United States v. Gilman,10 4 two instances of
housing discrimination by the management of an apartment building
were sufficient to constitute a "pattern or practice" under the
FHA. °5
In sum, the GAO need not find discrimination by every employer,
in every region, or in every industry to conclude that discriminatory
activity is widespread. The level of discriminatory activity already
identified in its two previous reports is sufficient to warrant the
GAO's certification of the issue to Congress for its expedited review
of employer sanctions.
3. What Does "Solely" Mean?
The GAO has suggested that the term "solely" requires an inquiry
into the motivation of employers to determine if employer sanctions
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (1982).
100. IRCA §§ 274(e), (f).
I01. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 59 (1986).
102. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.16 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 14,270 (1964)).
103. 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982).
104. 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, 474 F.2d 115, 124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, reh'g denied, 414 U.S.
1087 (1973) ("a 'group pattern or practice' of blockbusting is established when a number
of individuals utilize methods which violate [the FHA]").
105. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1314-15 (D. Md. 1969)
(three FHA violations found sufficient to establish a pattern or practice); see also Gold-
smith, RICO and 'Pattern,' 73 CORNELL L. REv. 971 (1988) (discussing RICO's provi-
sion that a pattern requires at least two acts of racketeering activity).
is the single causal factor in their discriminatory activity.1°o How-
ever, the legislative history relating to the term "solely"-requiring
that discrimination relevant to the GAO's mandate arise "solely"
from the implementation of employer sanctions-indicates that the
term should not be so narrowly construed.0 7
Instead of an inquiry into an employer's motive, the determination
of causation can properly be made by empirical review of the mode
and timing of discrimination. Discrimination which utilizes some as-
pect of employer sanctions-the 1-9 form or the documentation re-
quirements, for example-as the vehicle of the discrimination is
clearly effected "through" employer sanctions and relevant under the
GAO's mandate.
This objective approach is supported by the interpretation adopted
by courts in analogous contexts. For example, a similar construction
has been given the term "solely" under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). 108 ERISA exempts from the Act's
coverage any employee benefit plan that is "maintained 'solely' for
the purpose of complying with. . .[state] disability insurance
laws."' 1 9 But rather than engage in a "swearing contest concerning
[an employer's] motives," 110 the Supreme Court has indicated that
an objective test should apply:
The test is not one of the employer's motive-any employer could claim
that it provided disability benefits altruistically, to attract good employees,
or to increase employee productivity, as well as to obey state law-but
whether the plan, as an administrative unit, provides only those benefits
required by the applicable state law.111
Under IRCA, the circumstances under which a discriminatory
practice was adopted provide a good indication of whether the test of
"solely" is met. It is impossible and unnecessary to read an em-
ployer's mind to determine with certainty that a discriminatory prac-
tice would not have been adopted absent employer sanctions. But if,
for example, a discriminatory practice admittedly began or increased
106. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
107. 132 CONG. REC. H10,584 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Rodino (D. N.J.)); see also 131 CONG. REc. 23,718 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simpson);
131 CONG. REc. 23,315-18 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simpson); S. REP. No. 132, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. 104 (1985) (minority views of Sen. Kennedy). For example, Senator
Carl Levin (D. Mich.), when he voted to approve the Conference Committee's Report on
the immigration bill, noted that "[tihe bill also provides for GAO review of the employer
sanctions and the possibility that the sanctions will be phased out after 3 years if it is
found that they lead to discrimination against legal residents." 132 CONG. REc. S16,907
(daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (emphasis added).
108. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461) [hereinafter ERISA].
109. ERISA § 4(b)(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3)).
110. Delta Air Lines v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287, 1307 (2d Cir. 1981), affid in
part sub nora., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
111. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 107 (1983).
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in conjunction with the implementation of employer sanctions or in
anticipation of the sanctions provisions, it can fairly be said to result
from employer sanctions. Thus, a discriminatory practice accom-
plished through use of the 1-9 requirement is prima facie within the
GAO's mandate."' A discriminatory practice that does not relate
directly to the 1-9 requirement, such as failing to promote foreign-
looking workers, may nevertheless have begun or increased as a re-
sult of, or in anticipation of, employer sanctions, and thus fall within
the scope of the GAO's inquiry." 3
In sum, the term "solely" does not mandate an inquiry into an
employer's motivation. Instead, this standard can be met by a deter-
mination that the discrimination is accomplished through the 1-9 re-
quirement or that the discrimination began or increased as a result
of, or in anticipation of, employer sanctions.
PART III: THE DEBATE OVER A NATIONAL IDENTIFIER
The keynote address at the Symposium was given by Representa-
tive Howard Berman (D. Cal.), a member of the House Judiciary
Committee and Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Inter-
national Law. Representative Berman acknowledged that the Second
GAO Report and evidence collected by other governmental and non-
governmental groups indicate that IRCA has caused serious discrim-
ination. The Congressman warned, however, that instead of a reas-
sessment of employer sanctions, this evidence may encourage
Congress to reconsider a national identifier as a means to deter dis-
crimination," 4 responding to those who contend that discrimination
can be deterred by providing all eligible workers with uniform docu-
mentation. In fact, the possibility that Congress would sidestep the
modified sunset provision by reviving the national identifier debate
was addressed during the final Senate debate and passage of IRCA,
112. A similar approach has been adopted in Title VII retaliation suits under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2, where courts examine the timing of the claimant's and employer's
actions, rather than the employer's subjective intent, to evaluate a prima facie case of
retaliation. See supra note 38.
113. In essence, the GAO adopts this approach in its second report in setting out
the following hypothetical: "An example of what appears to be a potential sanction-re-
lated charge would be if an employer, after November 6, 1986, started a policy to hire
only U.S. citizens." SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 21. This is the same infor-
mation sought by the GAO's Survey of Employer Views, which asks "[flor each action/
activity, please indicate... whether or not your organization has started or increased
that action/activity since November 7." Id. at 78, app. II, question 17.
114. See Symposium, supra note 7, at 2-16 (speech by Rep. Howard Berman (D.
Cal.)).
when Senator Alan Cranston (D. Cal.) presciently observed that:
[e]mployer sanctions can be the first step toward a national identification
card-internal passport system-a primary tool of totalitarian governments
to restrict the freedom of its citizens. And, when employer sanctions are
discovered not to be working. . .that is when the danger of taking the sec-
ond step occurs.
This danger underscores the importance of the provision crafted by the
very able senior Senator from Massachusetts, Edward Kennedy, for a trig-
gered sunset of employer sanctions upon a finding by GAO that employer
sanctions are causing discrimination.' 15
The pros and cons of a national identifier, either in the form of a
new identification card, a social security card, or a computer regis-
try, were exhaustively debated during Congress's consideration of
IRCA.116 Congress ultimately concluded that the costs of such an
identification program and the risks that it would result in serious
civil liberties violations were too great to outweigh the possible en-
hanced enforcement of employer sanctions. Thus, while IRCA con-
templates some exploration of alternative employment verification
systems, 117 the immigration law specifically provides that "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to authorize, directly or indirectly,
the issuance or use of national identification cards or the establish-
ment of a national identification card.""' 8 Further, under IRCA, any
proposed alternative verification system must provide a reliable de-
termination of the holder's identity, use counterfeit-resistant docu-
ments, be used only for purposes of verifying work authorization,
and protect the privacy and security of personal information used in
the system."19 These limits on work authorization systems represent
important, minimal protections which are not met by any of the pro-
posed identification systems.
Nevertheless, new enthusiasm for a national identification card
may be appearing. While a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of
this Report, 'the prospect of a "national identity card" raises many
profound issues and appears to the Committee to be a fundamentally
misguided response for several reasons, a few of which are discussed
below.
First, a national identifier would be neither tamper-proof nor a
reliable indicator of the holder's identity. As the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA) informed Congress in 1981 regarding the utility
115. 132 CONG. REC. S16,904 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Cranston).
116. See, e.g., Systems to Verify Authorization to Work in the United States:
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Immigration Comm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Employer Sanctions: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Internat'l Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter Employer Sanctions Hearings].
117. IRCA § 274A(d).
118. IRCA § 274A(c).
119. IRCA § 274A(d)(2).
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of Social Security numbers (SSNs) for identity purposes, "[w]e do
not know of any way to make an absolutely tamper-proof or counter-
feit proof social security card. Even if a very secure card could be
developed, it would only be as valid as the documents it is based on,
and they themselves may not be reliable." 120 Moreover, the cost of
setting up such a system would be prohibitive. According to the
SSA, "[t]o verify the identity of 200 million people who now possess
SSN cards and reissue those cards on banknote paper would cost
close to one billion dollars and require over 50,000 federal employ-
ees." '121 The same limitations and verification costs are inherent in
any national identification scheme or computer registry.1 22
Second, there is no effective means to limit the use of a national
identity document. The effects of misuse are potentially devastating.
As John Shattuck of the American Civil Liberties Union noted in
testimony before Congress:
Because employment--or the inability to obtain it-are central factors in
determining a person's quality of life, a dossier system that can so easily be
used to control the employment opportunities and trace the movements of
hundreds 'of millions of people may be the most powerful tool for social
control that any government has ever devised. Neither good intentions nor
supposedly "stringent safeguards" can, in the long run, prevent its perver-
sion and abuse.1
23
The government's inability to guarantee the privacy and security
of information gathered for identification purposes was most recently
demonstrated in the controversy surrounding the SSA's routine ver-
ification of millions of SSNs for private credit companies. 12 Both
the Social Security Act and the Privacy Act forbid disclosure of this
confidential information.1 25 Yet more than three million numbers
120. Employer Sanctions Hearings, supra note 116, at 234 (testimony of Sandy
Crank, Associate Commissioner for Operational Policy and Procedures, Social Security
Administration).
121. Id.
122. The government is also unable to guard against human error in data han-
dling. Stories of incorrectly inputted data producing unforeseen detrimental consequences
have become commonplace. See, e.g., Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D.
Mich. 1980), affld, 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982) (error in consumer credit report). If the
national identifier was necessary to obtain employment, the effect of such errors would be
the loss of the individual's livelihood.
123. Employer Sanctions Hearings, supra note 116, at 327 (testimony of John H.
Shattuck, National Legislative Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
124. See, e.g., Tolchin, US. Checked Private Data for Business, N.Y. Times, Apr.
11, 1989, at A16, col. 6.
125. Tolchin, U.S. Wary Giving Social Security Numbers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1989, at A19, col. 1; Social Security: On Whose Account?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1989,
at A24, col. 1.
were verified before Congress was alerted to the situation.
In sum, a national identifier is not an appropriate response to the
evidence that widespread discrimination has resulted from employer
sanctions. A national identification system is costly and badly suited
to the task of deterring discrimination. More importantly, such a
system would pose significant threats to the civil rights and civil lib-
erties of all United States residents.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history and statutory analysis set out above indi-
cate that the phrase "widespread pattern of discrimination" was not
intended to be a stringent or technical test, but rather one that
would alert Congress to any new or increased discrimination result-
ing from sanctions. The data set out in the GAO's second report
meets this standard, particularly when augmented by the significant
evidence collected by the New York State Inter-Agency Task Force
and the individual case studies documented by civil rights groups,
immigrants' and refugee rights groups, and other nongovernmental
entities.
Reconsideration of a national identifier is not an appropriate re-
sponse to this evidence of discrimination. The statute itself dictates
the remedy: evidence of widespread discrimination will trigger expe-
dited congressional review of the employer sanctions provisions. In
the event that the GAO's third report finds levels of discrimination
that do not contradict the data set out in the second report, the GAO
is required by IRCA to certify the existence of a widespread pattern
of discrimination resulting from employer sanctions, and Congress
should immediately undertake the expedited review that such a re-
port would trigger. Upon such review, in recognition of the over-
whelming evidence that employer sanctions have resulted in a wide-
spread pattern of discrimination, Congress should repeal the
employer sanctions provisions of IRCA.
